The Civic Node

Doe v Bonnell ECF230 — Bonnell Opposition to Plaintiff MIL

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Original source

Summary

Bonnell’s April 13, 2026 opposition to Plaintiff’s motion in limine (ECF 224, not in the current filing set). Plaintiff sought to exclude consent evidence, evidence of Plaintiff’s sexual history and behavior, Bonnell’s self-generated documentation, and evidence about Solo/Rose. Bonnell argues each of these categories is directly relevant to the elements of Plaintiff’s claims — especially the consent and intent elements of CARDII, Florida Statute § 784.049, and IIED — and that exclusion would prevent a meaningful defense. The filing also addresses the spoilation/authentication issue and the question of evidence related to Solo and the video’s actual recipient.

Key Points

  • Consent is an essential element of three of Plaintiff’s four claims (Counts 1, 2, and 4); it is also an affirmative defense. Evidence of implied consent — Plaintiff’s own history of sending explicit material to Bonnell, soliciting similar material from him, and “having a lot of conversations about consent” — is directly relevant.
  • Plaintiff sent the video to her then-boyfriend MH before Bonnell allegedly shared it, admitted under oath at the preliminary injunction hearing. This is probative of whether Bonnell had an implied consent understanding.
  • CARDII’s own text requires showing the defendant “knows that, or recklessly disregards whether, the individual has not consented” — making Bonnell’s contemporaneous mental state regarding consent a required element; relevant evidence cannot be excluded.
  • Judge Torres at the preliminary injunction hearing expressly noted the consent/intent symmetry: “if that were true, then [Plaintiff is] guilty of cyber harassing because she sent a video of her former boyfriend … . So how is that any different?” — indicating the court already views consent as live and material.
  • Plaintiff’s Rule 412 argument (excluding sexual history evidence) does not apply: Rule 412 is limited to civil cases involving rape or sexual harassment (per Judd v. Rodman, 11th Cir. 1997); Plaintiff’s claims arise under CARDII and Florida tort law.
  • Plaintiff’s sexual conduct at issue: Plaintiff’s own complaint alleges she was “sexually inexperienced” before Bonnell; she testified under oath about soliciting explicit material from him and sending the video to her boyfriend. She cannot shield the jury from these self-introduced facts.
  • Spoliation/authentication at MIL stage: Plaintiff never filed a spoliation motion during discovery; using a MIL as a substitute for a motion to compel is procedurally improper per XTEC v. Cardsmart and Celler L. Org. v. Sony Pictures TV.
  • Evidence about Solo (the actual recipient of the video) cannot be excluded: it is essential to establishing the timing and date of transmission (the dispositive jurisdictional issue), and Solo’s UK residence explains the European date format. Plaintiff’s Footnote 2 allegation (minor claim) was false because Solo — not AH — was the account holder.
  • Plaintiff’s motion is “vague and overbroad” — courts must deny MILs that cannot be narrowly defined; the better practice is to rule on admissibility as evidence arises at trial.

Newsletter Angles

  • The consent/symmetry argument is the most narratively interesting: Bonnell’s defense is not “I had permission” but “my mental state about consent is exactly what the statute requires you to evaluate — and you can’t do that if you exclude all the context.”
  • The Rule 412 argument is a sleeper issue: if Rule 412 doesn’t apply to CARDII cases (as Bonnell argues), CARDII plaintiffs may face cross-examination on their sexual history that sexual assault plaintiffs are protected from. This could shape how victims evaluate whether to bring CARDII claims at all.
  • Judge Torres’s comment at the preliminary injunction hearing — essentially observing that Plaintiff’s own transmission of the video would be “cyber harassing” under the same statute — is the most evocative quote in the case for a newsletter piece about the symmetry of new revenge-porn laws.

Entities Mentioned

Concepts Mentioned

  • Reachability Routing — tangential; the real-time CDN argument is mostly resolved at this stage
  • Catfishing as Legal Gap — the Solo identity issue is central to why evidence about the “recipient” of the video matters

Quotes

“But if that were true, then [Plaintiff is] guilty of cyber harassing because she sent a video of her former boyfriend … . She may not have had any intention of causing substantial harm or emotional distress to her former boyfriend because she assumed she had consent, but she clearly disseminated it. So how is that any different?” — Magistrate Judge Torres, preliminary injunction hearing, June 3, 2025

“She then filed the instant lawsuit against Bonnell for doing the exact same thing. A jury should not be shielded from that fact.” — ECF 230 at 7

Notes

  • Filed the same day as ECF 231 (Plaintiff’s opposition to Bonnell’s omnibus MIL) — both sides exchanged MIL oppositions on April 13, 2026.
  • The May 18, 2026 trial date is still in place at the time of these filings; ECF 235 (opposition to Plaintiff’s trial continuance motion, April 17, 2026) is filed days later.
  • ECF 224 (Plaintiff’s MIL, seeking to exclude the “catfishing defense,” consent evidence, Bonnell’s documents, and Solo evidence) is not in the current filing set but is the motion being opposed here.
  • Melina Göransson remains a background figure; Plaintiff’s MIL reportedly also sought to introduce evidence from her, which would be consistent with the Rule 56(d) motion’s stated purpose.

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