Summary

Wikipedia’s comprehensive article on the Nixon Shock — the August 15, 1971 announcement by President Nixon suspending dollar-to-gold convertibility, ending the Bretton Woods system. Covers the structural causes (Vietnam War spending, gold outflow, dollar overvaluation), the Camp David secret meeting, the policy decisions, and the lasting consequences including floating exchange rates, SWIFT’s creation, and the beginning of the fiat dollar era.

Key Points

  • Date: August 15, 1971; announced on a Sunday while US financial markets were closed
  • US gold reserves had fallen from 574 million oz after WWII to 10,000 metric tonnes by August 1971
  • France had sent a ship to New York to retrieve gold deposits; Britain had requested $3 billion transferred from Fort Knox days before the announcement
  • Camp David meeting (August 13): Nixon, Burns, Connally, Volcker and 15 others debated the response
  • Actions taken: (1) suspended dollar-gold convertibility; (2) 90-day wage and price freeze; (3) 10% import surcharge
  • Political success: Dow rose 33 points August 16 (record); Nixon re-elected 1972 by historic landslide
  • Economic outcome: triggered 1973–1975 recession, stagflation of the 1970s, instability of floating currencies
  • Volcker later expressed regret: “Nobody’s in charge. The Europeans couldn’t live with the uncertainty and made their own currency and now that’s in trouble.”
  • Nixon Shock indirectly led to creation of SWIFT as international partners sought payment infrastructure outside US control
  • Post-1971: average federal deficit to GDP jumped from 0.6% (1951–71) to 3.0% (1972–2015)

Newsletter Angles

  • The “exorbitant privilege” framing (France’s Giscard d’Estaing) is directly applicable to current debates about dollar hegemony, Bitcoin as alternative reserve asset, and SWIFT weaponization
  • Nixon’s 10% import surcharge in 1971 is a direct ancestor of Trump’s 2025 tariff regime — same logic, different scale
  • SWIFT origin in Nixon Shock: countries have been trying to build dollar alternatives for 50 years; the current effort (DePIN, stablecoins, BRICS currency discussions) is the latest iteration

Entities Mentioned

  • Donald Trump — implicitly; his 2025 tariff policy echoes Nixon’s 1971 import surcharge
  • Paul Volcker — present at Camp David meeting; later expressed regret
  • Arthur Burns — consulted by Nixon in planning the shock
  • Federal Reserve — institutional context

Concepts Mentioned

Quotes

“If the British, who had founded the system with us, and who had fought so hard to defend their own currency, were going to take gold for their dollars, it was clear the game was indeed over.” — Paul Volcker (1992)

“It costs only a few cents for the Bureau of Engraving and Printing to produce a $100 bill, but other countries had to pony up $100 of actual goods in order to obtain one.” — Barry Eichengreen

Notes

Wikipedia article with strong sourcing. Framing is broadly neutral, drawing on academic sources (Eichengreen, Bordo, Garten). The libertarian critique (gold standard better; post-1971 era a “failed experiment”) is a distinct perspective covered separately in Forty-Five Years After the Gold Standard.